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One ofthe agreeable features about engaging in
practiceinthesphereofpersonalinjurieslitigation
is theopportunity whichitgives to lawyers to get
to know a variety ofmedical practitioners. Over
some25 years Imade ahostofgoodfriendsinthe
medical profession, and I amglad to see so many
here tonight, together with some legal stalwarts
who are brave enough to put up with listening to
me holding forth yet again. May I say what a
pleasure it is to have the chance to address you
and to renew old friendships.
The aspect of medical practice and its interface
with the law which I want to discuss tonight is
that of consent, the type of patient's consent
which is required for medical and surgical
procedures and the problems which can arise -
and many of them have arisen in the past.
Ifonegoes farenoughbackintime-andperhaps
not beyond the professional lifetime of some of
the audience tonight-consentdidnotpose much
of a problem. You will of course remember that
Hippocrateshimselfadvisedphysicianstoconceal
most things from the patients, as when given
information many patients have taken a turn for
the worse. There is little doubt that there has
historically been a paternalistic tinge to the
practice of medicine, what one commentator
called "the oracular nature of early medicine,
withheavyrelianceonmagicalpowersandritual
in preserving the mystique ofthe healer." One
also finds traces in some ofthe cases oftheview,
now perhaps regarded as old-fashioned, that
patients prefer to put themselves in the hands of
theirdoctorsandaremademoreanxiousbybeing
given additional information. And think of the
great surgeon SirLancelotSprattinDoctorin the
House: to the grandees of his day the idea that a
patient might have a say in the operation to be
carried out would have been outwith his
contemplation. Ifthepatienthadhadthetemerity
to pipe up and announce that he did not agree to
it, Sir Lancelot (and many others of his time)
wouldhaveregardedthatas conclusive evidence
ofmentalincapacity. Andthemindbogglesatthe
reaction he would have shown ifthe patient had
attempted to sue him.
Modernlegalandethicalrequirementshavemade
a big difference to the approach which doctors
are obliged to adopt these days, and there is a
discernible tendency to overloadtheinformation
dumped on the patients about infinitesimal risks
until the unhappy souls are either scared out of
theirwitsordisregardthelotasincomprehensible
mumbo-jumbo.
Consent as a concept is not a difficult thing, and
any sensible person will ordinarily know quite
easily when a patient consents to treatment.
Lawyers love to break things down into
components, however, and preferably to
complicate them abit, and so I can defineforyou




There is not really any magic in any of these.
Obviouslyifapatienthasnotlegalcapacity, heor
she cannot give consent. Equally obviously, ifit
is not voluntary no one could call it consent. The
thirdpart, information, overlapstoanextentwith
the second, because ifyou do notknow what you
are agreeingto, you canhardly give true consent.
Thispartisabitmoredifficulttoapplyinpractice.
Perhaps I could say a word about each of these
and how they affect the way that doctors have to
go about their work and make their decisions.
You will, I am sure, be aware that medico-legal
text books contain ahefty chunk on the subject -
100 pages in Professor Michael Jones' tome on
* now Lord Carswell, Lord ofAppeal in Ordinary, in the
House of Lords.
C) The Ulster Medical Society, 2004.The Ulster Medical Journal
medical negligence - and you could write a book
on that topic alone, as London barrister Andrew
Hockton has recently done. Indeed, a glance
through the contents table ofhis book will show
the breadth of issues on which the question of
consent bears - children, incompetent adults,
information and the duty ofcandour, negligence
and causation. These concern such medical
questions as sterilisation, abortion, blood
transfusions,anorexia,euthanasiaandtermination
of life, all against the background of the
requirements ofthe law and the GMC guidelines
on ethical practice.
One might start by asking what is the purpose of
obtaining the patient's consent to a specified
treatment. Theanswerisclear: itisaprotectionto
the doctor against committing the actionable tort
ofbattery. It has often been described as the key
whichunlocks the door, butLord Donaldson MR
in Re W (a minor) in 1992 preferred a different
simile, alegal flakjacket, whichprotects doctors
from litigious claims by giving them the right to
proceed. Thatis the legal purpose ofconsent, but
Lord Donaldson pointed out that the clinical
purpose is of prime importance in medical
practice, because a patient's confidence in the
efficacyoftreatmentisamajorfactorcontributing
to the treatment's success.
Butbeforetheycandontheirflakjackets,doctors
have to be clear on our three elements. So let us
look for a moment at the first, the patient's
capacity. Itmay seemobvious andsuperfluous to
say that an adult of sound mind can and must
make his or her own decision, but that statement
conceals anumberofserious practical problems.
TheAmerican surgeonArulGawande inhisbook
Complications tells a heartbreaking story of a
patient in his early sixties with extensive and
untreatable cancer who insisted on having spinal
surgery which might prolong his life a little but
which contained severe risks of serious damage
and the certainty of a long, difficult and painful
recovery. He was very thoroughly and
meticulously warnedoftherisks and informedof
the options -the overwhelming preference ofthe
doctors was to do nothing and let him go home
andreceivehospicecare, whichgavehimthebest
chance of dying peacefully. He insisted on
proceeding and despite the best care - and the
account given of the care devoted to him was
impressive -theresult was veryunhappyindeed,
described in harrowing detail by Dr Gawande,
and he died in severe discomfort after fourteen
days. Yetlegallyand, Ithink,ethicallythedoctors
were right. He had to make the choice, and the
ability tochoose mustimply thefreedomtomake
the wrong choice. The patient's decision may
appear irrational to any doctor or lawyer, but he
isentitledtomakeit,eventotheextentofrefusing




example of the latter from her own experience.
Ms B was an able and talented woman of 43,
holding a responsible position in the NHS, who
through a devastating illness had become
tetraplegic and who no longer wished to be kept
alive by artificial means. To begin with, her
doctors took the view that she must be
incompetent. They focused on the decision she
had made, ratherthan onheractual state ofmind,
and decided that this decision could not be the
product ofa competent mind. Howeverwhen the
medicalexperts cameto giveevidence in court, it
wasuniversallyagreedthatMsB wasquiteclearly
mentally competent. It was clear that herright to
choose to come offthe ventilator without which
she could not breathe had to be respected. Dame
Elizabeth so decided and gave a declaration that
the hospital must follow Ms B's instructions to
withdraw her artificial ventilation. In so doing
thejudge hoped, though faintly, that Ms B might
reconsider her decision, but she did not, and she
died peacefully a short time later.
Ifthepatientdoesnothavepropermentalcapacity,
no one can give consent on his or her behalf and
ithas tobe obtainedfromthe court (I leave outof
accounttheexceptions,treatmentunderthemental
health legislationforconditions affecting mental
health and treatment in an emergency). There
maybedifficultiesinpracticeinassessingmental
capacity, but the rule is clear enough.
When we come to look at the position ofminors,
thedifficultiesfairlybristle. Onemightinnocently
suppose that because the age ofmajority is 18, a
patientunderthatagecannotgiveorrefuseconsent
to treatment. I regret to say that one would be
severely disappointed, and the rules which have
been built up are complex and to some extent
baffling. Anyexperiencedpractitionerwillknow
at once the areas in which the problems lie, the
foremostbeing onthe one sidecontraception and
abortion, where the child will be anxious to have
medical treatment and the parents may oppose it;
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andontheothersideanorexia, wheretheopposite
may prevail.
The first inroad into the simple rule ofconsent at
the age of 18 was made by section4 ofthe Age of
MajorityAct(NI) 1969, by whichachildaged 16
or more may give consent to medical treatment -
though not the donation of organs or blood or
otherprocedureswhichdonotconstitutetreatment
ordiagnosis. The second was made by the courts
in the litigation brought by the renowned Mrs
Gillick. Mrs Gillick was one of the type of
formidableladiesofstrongmoralfibreandstrong
moralviewswhoformthebackboneofallworthy
bodies such as the Mothers' Union and the WI -
though Icould hardly imagineherposing as Miss
November for the famous calendar. The DHSS
issuedacirculartoareahealthauthoritiesadvising
them that doctors consulted at family plhnning
clinicscouldlawfullyprescribecontraceptives to
girls under 16, if acting in good faith to protect
themagainstthe harmful consequences ofsexual




authority and the case went right to the House of
Lords, where she narrowly but decisively lost.
Theresult is that achildunder 16 who is what we
nowcallGillickcompetentmaygivevalidconsent
to treatment on his or her own behalf, provided
(and the proviso is important) that the treatment
is in the child's best interests. The courts have
saidthatwhatconstitutes Gillickcompetence is a
question of fact, which they usually say when
they want to let someone else take the
responsibility. Itwilldepend onthe age and level
of understanding of the child and also on the
complexity and importance of the treatment -
consent to setting a fracture of the arm is not
rocket science, whereas all doctors can think of
difficult clinical decisions which ayoung person
may not have the maturity orjudgment to make
unaided.
I cannot give you a set of hard and fast rules to
govern the case of minors, but two guiding
principles can be distilled from the voluminous
case-law:
1. No doctor can be required to treat a child,
either by the child, the parents or the court. It
is adecision forthe doctor's ownprofessional
judgment, subjecttothethresholdrequirement
of a valid consent.
2. There can be concurrent powers to consent.
Either the child or the parents may be able to
give valid consent, in which event only the
failure orrefusal by all will create a veto. The
somewhatstrangepositionisthatthechildcan
give consentunder 18, but cannotrefuse it, so
the parent may give an overriding consent
which will be valid if the child refuses (this
may be important in anorexia cases).
The court can, however, give its consent and
override a refusal which would block treatment,
provided it is in the best interests of the child.
There have been many carefully thought out
statements of the law about the extent of the
court's power and the occasions on which it
should be exercised, but I need not trouble you
withthemtonight. AllIneedsayisthatsometimes
the decision is not difficult to make, as I found in
a recent case of a boy with vCJD (though there
was no question of going against the family
wishes in that case, they were very keen on the
treatment). In other cases it may be fiendishly
difficult, and you will remember how the Court
ofAppealinEnglandwrestledlikeJacobwiththe
angel when presented with the problem of the
conjoined twins.
Once you have determined that the patient or
some person on his behalf can give consent, the
next question which arises is the amount of
information which a doctor is required to furnish
to him in order to make that consent valid. It is
here thatthe law has someratherstrange answers
which I am not at all sure are very sound in
principle. If you read the GMC or the Royal
CollegeofSurgeonsguidelinesonseekingconsent
you will find constant references to "informed
consent", aconceptwhichrequiresthatthepatient
be given all the facts in a complete and
comprehensible form, that all possibilities,
including non-operative methods and non-
treatment, are discussed, that adescription ofthe
expected outcome for each alternative procedure
be given and that the patient should take part and
share in decisions and give active, not passive,
consent.Thisisnotonlyexcellentpracticaladvice
to doctors, but it constitutes the ethical
requirement of their professional bodies, which
of course they must observe. I think that it may
represent the reaction of the profession to the
conclusionreached in a 1986 studythatdoctors at
that time regularly underestimated the amount
that patients wanted to know.
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Oddly enough perhaps, it does not represent the
law. In our law it does not take very much
informationtogroundavalidconsent. Consentis
consent,evenifthepatientonlyknowstheoutline
of what the treatment is; so long as he is aware
whathe is agreeingto, his consentis validin law.
There is, however, acatch, as youmightsuppose.
It is part ofthe comprehensive duty owed by the
doctor to give the patient proper information
abouttheproposedtreatment, andinparticularto
warn ofthe risks which it may entail, and failure
todosotothestandardofareasonablepractitioner
will be actionable negligence. So obtaining the
rugged consent required by English law is not
enough: you must observe the professional
standards of a reasonable medical practitioner
practising in that field in order to discharge your
legal duty.
Letmegiveyouacoupleofexampleswhichhave
occurred in cases which I myselftried as ajudge
in the High Court:
1. AyoungwomanwasplaguedwithRaynaud's
Disease, which caused blueness and swelling in
her feet and ankles and severe pains in her legs.
She wasreferredto avascular surgeon, who after
carrying out tests recommended that she should
have a sympathectomy, done by the chemical
method, involving the injection of a solution of
phenol to burn the tissue of the sympathetic
nerve. The object ofthe treatment was to destroy
the lumbar sympathetic chain which supplies
nervous control to the small blood vessels in the
feet, and that should have removed the cause of
the spasm and cured the affliction.
The injection was done by a consultant
anaesthetist and it was accepted that it was done
with proper professional skill and competence.
Unhappily there occurred one oftheknown side-
effects, the irritation ofthe genitofemoral nerve
resulting inhyperaesthesia. Normallythislasts at
most a few weeks, but in the case in question it
persisted and undoubtedly caused the patient
muchdistress anddiscomfort. The caseturned on





the location of the incision and the conspicuous
nature ofthe resulting scar. She claimed that she
was assured that it would be done by means of a
Pfannenstiel's incision, leaving what the lady
referred to throughout the case as a bikini-line
scar. In the event the surgeon did not find it
possible to make that type of incision and for
good medical reasons made a mid-line vertical
incision, which left a much more conspicuous
scar. The patient became very distressed when
she discovered the location ofthe operation scar
and claimed that she had been given a guarantee
that she wouldbe left with abikini-line scar. The
surgeon for his part maintained that he could
never have given such a guarantee, as the final
decision on the incision could only be made on
propersurgical grounds atthe commencementof
the operation.
Neither of these patients succeeded in her claim
for negligence, because the doctors established
onthefactsthattheyhadgivenproperinformation
andwarning inthecircumstances ofthecase. But




How should doctors guard against it?
Letmereturntothequestionofinformedconsent.
Thatis aconcept adoptedin many othercommon
law jurisdictions, notably in North America. It
starts from the premise that medical treatment is
a trespass or battery and that will be actionable
unless proper consent is given by the patient,
whichisinterpretedasinformedconsent. Inorder
to obtain an informed consent the doctor must
disclose all material risks. What are material
risks? They are determined by the "prudent
patient" test, formulated as follows intheleading
American case of Canterbury v Spence, decided
in 1972:
"A risk is material when a reasonable
person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position,
would be likely to attach significance to
the risk or cluster of risks in deciding
whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy."
It is subject to the exception of the "therapeutic
privilege", which enables a doctor to withhold
information as to risk when areasonable medical
assessment would have indicated to the doctor
that disclosure would have posed a serious threat
ofpsychological detriment to the patient.
This standard is rather good advice to doctors
who wish to know the extent of their ethical
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obligation under the professional guidelines,
though my personal advice would be to be
extremely cautious about exercising the
therapeutic privilege. But it does not represent
our law, at least not at the present time. I insert
this caveat because our law is moving into an era
of rights-based doctrines, particularly since the
Human Rights Act incorporated the European
Convention on Human Rights into our law. And
fairlyrecentlyLordIrvineofLairginanarticlein
theMedicalLawReviewsuggestedthattherights-
based approach may encourage the courts to
move away fromthetraditional doctrine towards
that of informed consent. It does seem to me
fairly likely that lawyers will cross-examine
doctors about their observance ofthe guidelines,
so be warned.
Ireferred amoment ago tothe standardofcare of
a reasonable medical practitioner, but much as I
mighthesitate to burden you withcomplications,
I fear that I have to do it, for we are getting into
what is known as Bolam territory. I think that I
had better go back to basics for a moment, and I
hope that the lawyers will forgive me for stating
what to them is obvious and elementary.
Ingeneral the standardofcarewhichmembers of
anyprofessionareexpectedtoreachintheexercise
of the skills of their avocation is that of a
reasonablycompetentmemberofthatprofession,
the professional equivalent of that paragon of
prudence,themanontheClaphamomnibus(I am
afraid that this mythical character is a classic
example of how the law clings to outdated
institutions: the Clapham omnibus ceased to run
in 1914).
If you are an architect or engineer, a landscape
gardener or a marine hydrographer, that is the
rule which will apply in unqualified form to the
issue ofyourliability ifyourclient has sustained
damage and seeks to hold you liable. One will
generally find that an expert in your field will
give evidence on each side about the standard of
carewhichareasonableprofessional shouldadopt,
and at the end ofthe day thejudge has to decide
whetherthatstandardhasbeenreachedorwhether
you the defendant have fallen short of it. In the
process he may have to weigh up the evidence of
theexpertsifitconflicts anddecidewhichshould
be preferred.
Not so for doctors. Their liability is governed by
the well known Bolam test. Under that test if a
doctor has followed a practice adopted by a
responsible body ofpractitioners he or she is not
toberegardedas havingbeennegligent. In short,
medical judgment rules, or doctor knows best.
This is not the law in other spheres ofactivity. In
the realm of industrial accidents it was thought
for many years that following the established
practice was a sufficient defence. But the
employers' confidence in trade practice was
rudelyshatteredwhenacasefromthisjurisdiction,
Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Ltd went to the
House ofLords in 1959 and their Lordships held
that trade practice is not conclusive. It may be
strong evidence of lack of negligence if the
defendanthasfollowedit,butitis stillopentothe
tribunal of fact to hold that that was not good
enough.
One might have thought that medical negligence
would be approached in the same way. But the
issue was dealt with in 1957 by a puisnejudge in
the Queen's Bench Division charging a jury in
BolamvFriernHospitalManagementCommittee
a case where the plaintiff had been undergoing
ECT for treatment of a psychiatric disorder. In
the course of this treatment he sustained
dislocation of both hip joints, with fractures of
the acetabulum and pelvis on each side. It was
claimed that relaxant drugs should have been
administered or manual control exercised, but it
wasprovedthatdifferentviews wereheldamong
competentdoctorsabouttheadvisabilityoftaking
either step. The trial judge directed the jury in
these terms:
"A doctor is not guilty ofnegligence ifhe
has acted in accordance with a practice
accepted as proper by a responsible body
of medical men skilled in that particular
art."
He went on to say that it was not essential for the
jury to decide which of two practices was the
betterpractice, as long astheyacceptedthatwhat
the doctor did was in accordance with a practice
accepted by responsible persons. You can see at
once that this has got away from the general rule
that the standard is that ofreasonable care in all
thecircumstances,tobedeterminedbythetribunal
of fact.
The Bolam test has remained part of law for
nearly 50 years now, though often criticised, and
with some modification: in Bolitho v City and
Hackney Health Authority in 1997 the House of
Lords emphasised that to satisfy the requirement
the body ofmedical opinion relied upon must be
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not only responsible but respectable and
reasonable. In order to qualify it must have a
logicalbasis, formedbyexpertswhohavedirected
their minds to the question of comparative risks
andbenefits andreached adefensible conclusion
on the matter. Once such a body of opinion has
been provedto exist, however, thatis a sufficient
defence and thejudge is not at liberty to pick and
choosebetweentheopinionsexpressedbymedical
experts, even though he might do that very thing
in the next case involving the liability of a
structural engineer.
Onemighthavethoughtthatevenifitisjustifiable
on pragmatic grounds to judge the standard of
actual treatment by this Bolam test, that should
hardly apply to the issue ofliability for failing to
give a patient sufficient warning of adverse
consequences of a proposed treatment, and one
mighthavehopedthatthecourts wouldnotapply
the Bolam test in this area.
Unhappily for the law, at least in my own view,
thatwasnottobe,andthecourtsbecamedistracted
once again by the siren call ofBolam. In the case
ofSidawayvBethlemRoyalHospital Governors,
decided in 1985, the House ofLords came down
once again on the side of the application of the
Bolam test and held that it should be applied in
the sphere ofwarning ofrisksjust as much as in
diagnosis and treatment.
The patient, a woman of 63, had suffered from
persistent pain in her neck and shoulders. She
was advised by a neuro-surgeon, correctly as the
court found, to have an operation on her neck to
relieve pressure on a nerve root. The operation
consisted of a laminectomy of C4 and a
facetectomy or foraminectomy ofthe disc space
between C4 and C5. The trialjudge describedthe
procedure as follows:
"A laminectomy is an excision of the
posterior arch ofthe vertebra. It gives the
surgeon access to the foramen or channel
throughwhichnervestravelfromthespine
laterally ... [Thesurgeon] freedthefourth
cervicalnerverootbyremovingthefacets,
or small bony protuberances, from the
fourth vertebra and used a dental drill to
free the nerve within the foramen."
It was found that the surgeon carried out the
operation with proper skill and care, but sadly in
its course some damage occurred to the spinal
cord which caused a partial paraplegia. It was
known that there was arisk ofthis occurring, the
extent of which the medical witnesses placed at
less than one per cent. The issue was whether
sufficientwarninghadbeen givenby the surgeon
before the operation. The evidence was less than
clear, because the surgeon had died before trial,
butthejudge held that it was probable thathe did
notreferspecificallytothedangerofcorddamage
when discussing the operation with her. There
was, however, a responsible body of medical
opinion which would not have given such a
warning. The judge held that this concluded the
matter, and the Court of Appeal and House of
Lords upheld his decision. So once again the law
has got away fromthe standardtestofreasonable
care, to be decided by the tribunal of fact.
The extension of the Bolam test to cases of
warning has been strenuously criticised, I think
with some justification. One can see a case for
saying that it is extremely difficult for a layman
to make a proper judgment about matter of
diagnosis andtreatment, and sointhatsphereone
shouldacceptthatifabodyofresponsibledoctors
would have taken the same course that should be
a good enough defence. As I have said, I don't
acceptthis,butonecanatleastseetheforceofthe
argument. But why should this be so when the
issue is one of giving a sufficient warning, on
whichalaymancan farmorereadilycomprehend
the issues and form ajudgment? The courts have
not allowed experts' opinion to be conclusive in
otherfields, sowhy shouldthey do so inthis one?
I think myselfthat it was a pity that the House of
Lords did not see fit to adopt the regular method
of determining the standard of care and take the
opportunity to reject Bolam in this segment of
medical negligence, which might have opened
the way for jettisoning it altogether in some
future case. Butitwas not tobe, andone canonly
hope that it may reconsider the subject in time
and reverse the rule. What are the prospects of
this? Who knows? It might, but don't hold your
breath waiting for it.
Let us suppose then that the doctor has failed to
give the patient a sufficient warning and is to be
regarded ashavingbeennegligentinthatrespect.
What would the patient have done if a proper
warning had been given? It would hardly accord
with most people's sense of justice to hold the
doctor liable for damages if that patient was set
onhavingthattreatmentandwouldnothavebeen
putoffin theslightest ifthefullestwarning ofthe
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risks had been given. I am glad to be able to say
thatthe law does notperpetrate suchan injustice,
but I am also sorry to say that it has got itselfinto
some rather tortuous complications in trying to
achieve aproperresult. This part ofthe thicket is
one for the lawyers to struggle through, rather
than the doctors, who have done their best, or
rather worst, and have to leave the unravelling to
the otherprofession; butthe difficulties involved
may serve as a cautionary tale which will remind
doctors of the need to stay alert to the need for
warnings.
Itisanecessarypartofaplaintiff'sproofsthatthe
defendant's act or omission, in these cases the
failure towarnofrisks, causedtheloss sustained,
thatis,theactualoccurrenceofoneofthepossible
eventualities ofwhich warning should havebeen
given. Ourlawhas always hadproblems with the
concept of causation. One sees in the reported
cases depressingly frequent references to
causation being a matter ofcommon sense, often
describedas"ordinary" commonsenseor"good"
common sense. But one man's sense may be
another man's nonsense, and whole books have
been written on causation withoutproducing any
clear and workable tests. A celebrated article on
thetopicbythedistinguishedacademic SirArthur
Goodhart commenced with a passage to the
following effect:
"My grandson, aged three, fell over a
chair. Being an intelligent child, he
thereupon proceeded to kick the chair."
I fear that the discussion ofthe subject, certainly
in decided cases, all too frequently fails to get
above this level ofphilosophical subtlety.
Let me pose a couple of scenarios to you, taken
from actual decisions, and ask you how you
would have decided each case. The first is an
Australian case, Chappel v Hart. The patient
suffered from a pharyngeal pouch, a relentlessly
progressive throat condition which required
surgery. No matter how carefully or well the
surgery was performed, it entailed a very slight
risk of injury to the vocal cords which would
leave the patient with a weak and gravelly voice.
The doctor failed to warn her of the risk of
damage to her vocal cords. She consented to the
surgery and suffered damage to her cords.
Understandably, then, she was veryupsetthatthe
doctorhadperformedtheoperationwithprecisely
the result she had feared.
It was notdisputed thatthe doctor hadperformed
the operation with reasonable care, but it was
accepted that he was in breach of his duty to
inform the patient. The difficulty in the case
arose from a combination of several other of its
features. First, she would sooner or later have
needed an operation ofthe type he performed on
her (although it was not essential at the time it
was done), and she wouldhave had the operation
at some time evenknowing ofthe risk ofdamage
to her vocal cords. Secondly, the risk of what
happened to her was inherent in that type of
operationnomatterwhoperformedit, orwhenor
how well it was performed. But, thirdly, if the
doctor had performed his duty to inform the
patient of the risk, she would have sought a
secondopinionandwouldhavehadtheoperation
performed by the most skilled and experienced
surgeon available. What do you think was the
result? Did the patient win or lose? Well, after a
long legalbattle the HighCourtofAustraliaheld
by a majority that she could recover substantial
damages.
The second case is an English decision, Chester
v Afshar, decided in 2002. The patient was a
journalist who had a history of miserable back
pain. She saw asurgeon, whoadvisedherthatshe
needed three bulging discs removed and that in
his hands the operation (microdiscectomy L3/4
and L4/5) would be straightforward; he gave her
the impression that it was virtually risk-free.
Unfortunately, things did not go as planned. The
patient suffered both motor and sensory
impairment, which was not cured by a second
operation.Theonlyexplanationforthcomingwas
one of cauda equina contusion that may have
occurred during the first operation. She sued for
damages,allegingthatthesurgerywasnegligently
performed. This part ofthe case did not succeed
at trial. So she was back to the case based on
failure to inform her of the risks. The relevant
factors are hard to fit into a logical pattern:
1. The risk of nerve damage was very small,
perhaps 1 to 2 per cent (though the surgeon
himselfestimated it at the remarkably precise
figure of 0.9 %).
2. Nevertheless, ifhe hadwarnedher, she would
not have proceeded with surgery at that time.
3. As it was elective surgery and there was no
need for speed, she would havepostponed the
surgery, but would probably have sought
anotheropinion andhadtheproceduredone at
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a later stage.
4. Since the risk was so small, the odds were
stronglyinfavourofherbeinglessunfortunate
the next time.
Should she win? Should she recover full
substantial damages? The trial judge and the
Court ofAppeal held that she should.
This is very difficult territory, and I am rather
reluctanttobecriticalofdecisionswhichIshould
have foundextremely difficultiffacedwiththem
myself. But I do wonder if a better approach
mightnothavebeenviatheconceptofmeasuring
achance, which is used in other areas oftort law,
and is very familiar to practitioners negotiating
settlements. It would then not be aquestion ofall
duck or no dinner, but of what proportion ofthe
full value of the damage sustained the plaintiff
should recover. That has not found favour with
-our courts in this area of the law, or at least not
yet. But some day perhaps it might ...
Can I draw the threads of these rambling
disquisitions together in order to see if there are
any nostrums which I can offerto doctors -with,
I may say, all the diffidence with which a
practitioner in one discipline should feel when
offering advice to experts in another:
1. I have no doubt that you have all made
yourselves familiarwiththeethicalguidelines
of the GMC and Royal College of Surgeons,
for these are prime sources of guidance and
instruction for members of your profession.
2. Obtaining consentis amoredifficultmatterin
some cases than might have been thought in
the past, and you might consider the wisdom
of having it done at a suitably experienced
level, not delegated to colleagues who are too
junior.
3. Taking time to understand the concerns ofthe
particular patient is important, and then to
explaintothatpatient atalevelofdetailwhich
he or she can understand what the treatment
involves and where any material problems or
risks may lie.
4. Above all, keep as good a note as you can. I
know how difficult that must be when you are
under pressure to deal with many things and
time is at a premium - nor is it the most
riveting task. But it can save you enormous
worry andpossible exposure toliability ifyou
canprovemonthsoryearslater, whenordinary
recollection has naturally disappeared with
time,whatyousaidandwhatthepatientagreed
to.
One ofthe favourite hoary old stories oflawyers
is ofF. E. Smith, whenhe was abrashyoung man
who frequently crossed swords with a particular
county courtjudge. On one occasion thatjudge,
after listening to an elaborate argument from F.
E., remarked rathertestily that he had listened to
counsel's argument and was no wiser for it, to
whichF.E.repliedsilkily"Nowiser,yourHonour,
but much better informed." I venture to doubt
whether any of you present tonight are much
wiser for listening to this paper, but I hope that
you may be a little better informed and may be
able to take something ofbenefit away from this
evening.
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